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ABSTRACT 
Techniques described herein augment packet tagging Distributed Denial-of-Service 
(DDOS) mitigation solutions with a powerful anti-spoofing capability.  A Segment Routing 
over Internet Protocol (IP) version 6 (SRv6) network programming technique is proposed 
herein wherein authenticated sessions are given an SRv6 header to append to all outbound 
packets. Traffic with the valid SRv6 header is allowed to pass thru the service provider 
network whereas all other traffic destined to the victim of the DDOS attack is dropped.  
The valid SRv6 header address can be rotated from amongst the 18, 446, 744, 073, 709, 
551, and 616 possible addresses found in a /64 IPv6 subnet, thus making it nearly 
impossible to spoof the valid SRv6 address. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Any organization with an online presence can be subject to a Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDOS) attack.  Traditionally, DDOS detection and mitigation techniques 
involve Central Processing Unit (CPU) intensive processes that try and sort valid traffic 
from attack traffic by comparing signatures and examining different attributes of the traffic, 
and then creating deep packet inspection filters to block the traffic. These implementations 
tend to be centralized, and therefore subject to DDOS themselves, and often require costly 
specialized hardware. 
Dataplane-based DDOS mitigation solutions have the potential to deliver very high 
performance at low cost, however, they are subject to potential spoofing by malicious 
actors.  
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The solution proposed herein augments packet tagging DDOS mitigation solutions 
with a powerful anti-spoofing capability.  In particular, this proposal provides a SRv6 
network programming technique in which authenticated sessions are given a SRv6 header 
to append to all outbound packets. Traffic with the valid SRv6 header is allowed to pass 
thru the service provider network whereas all other traffic destined to the victim of the 
DDOS attack is dropped, as illustrated in Figure 1, below.    
 
Figure 1 
The valid SRv6 header address can be randomly rotated from amongst the 18, 446, 
744, 073, 709, 551, and 616 possible addresses found in a /64 IPv6 subnet. Once the new 
SRv6 header has been distributed to authenticated users, the packet dropping filters are 
updated to allow the new header to pass and drop all other traffic. 
The packet dropping filters can be automatically generated and distributed to all 
nodes around the outer edges of the network via network automation tooling, which 
provides a highly distributed, and therefore highly scalable architecture for mitigation. 
An additional benefit of this proposal is its ability to operate across network 
domains or autonomous systems. For example, a service provider offering the DDOS 
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mitigation service can advertise the SRv6 /64 subnet across Autonomous System Number 
(ASN) or domain boundaries.  The SRv6 address itself is a valid IPv6 address and therefore 
a downstream domain or ASN would forward traffic to the destination subnet so long as it 
complies with that ASN's respecting routing policy. 
It is possible that a malicious actor could learn the valid SRv6 header and distribute 
it to their botnet. To address this proposal provides for rotating the valid SRv6 header using 
the SRv6 network programming locator/function structure, as illustrated in Figure 2, below.  
 
Figure 2 
For this feature, the SRv6 locator (subnet) remains the same and the individual IPv6 
address rotates using a randomly chosen value in the function /64 portion of the subnet.  
Rotating the valid SRv6 address (or addresses) from amongst such a massive pool provides 
a strong anti-spoofing capability. In some implementations, the address rotation itself could 
be provided on a regular or random time interval. This anti-spoofing capability could only 
be broken if a malicious actor managed to: 
1. Sniff a valid user's packets on the network 
2. Capture the valid SRv6 header, and then 
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3. Develop a technique to distribute the valid header information to enough bots to 
use in their attack before the next header rotation occurs. 
An operator may have the option of assigning a single SRv6 header from the /64 
block for all authenticated users. Or the service provider could assign different SRv6 
addresses within the /64 block to groups of users based on geographic location, customer 
ID range, subscriber tier, or other status. The grouping technique is illustrated in Figure 3, 
below.  
 
Figure 3 
The grouping technique may provide additional protection against a malicious actor 
sniffing packets and distributing the valid header information throughout their botnet as 
this involves the actor to also know the SRv6 header grouping technique (e.g., by 
geography, customer ID, etc.) and develop some mapping technique to associate the proper 
SRv6 header to the appropriate bot(s). 
This proposal may provide advantages over 802.1x, which does not work over the 
Internet.  In particular, this proposal provides for appending authenticated sessions with 
Internet routable SRv6 (IPv6) headers; thus, all routers (edge, transit, etc.) may participate 
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in forwarding or enforcement. Further, this solution operates in the dataplane, thereby 
providing line rate performance at a very high scale and is enforced at the network edge 
such that the solution may not involve firewalls or other appliance-based middle boxes. 
Thus, this solution provides an Internet-routable SRv6 header-ID method, which 
allows traffic from authenticated nodes to bypass Access Control Lists (ACLs) or other 
filters at the network edge.  
The techniques presented herein could also be augmented by Unique Identifier 
(UID) rotation and grouping tools.  For example, if an authenticated node becomes 
compromised, the SRv6 ID rotation and location grouping techniques described herein may 
allow detection systems to narrow down attack sources. Once identified, the attack sources 
could simply not be given an updated SRv6 ID on the next key rotation. In some 
implementations, unique identifiers could be offered for regions and then if there is an 
attack, the identifiers could be more granularly changed to isolate the bad systems.  
In some implementations, unique filtering can be applied during setup such that 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices would need to authenticate and append traffic with an 
appropriate SRv6 UID tag. Thus, the techniques presented herein may provide additional 
value to IoT technologies as embedded headers may provide a user/operator the ability to 
perform packet tracing and/or other debugging tasks. 
Accordingly, this dataplane-based DDOS mitigation plus anti-spoofing solution 
provides greater scale, nearly unbreakable anti-spoofing, and the automated distribution of 
traffic filters to all edge nodes provides much faster response to DDOS attacks than current 
solutions on the market. 
In summary, techniques herein provide for the ability to augment packet tagging 
DDOS mitigation solutions with a powerful anti-spoofing capability.  A SRv6 network 
programming technique is proposed in which authenticated sessions are given a SRv6 
header to append to all outbound packets.  Traffic with the valid SRv6 header is allowed 
to pass thru the service provider network whereas all other traffic destined to the victim of 
the DDOS attack is dropped.  The valid SRv6 header address can be rotated from amongst 
the 18, 446, 744, 073, 709, 551, and 616 possible addresses found in a /64 IPv6 subnet, 
thus making it nearly impossible to spoof the valid SRv6 address. 
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